“A common feature of European football is its open system of promotion and relegation. Even at the top of the Premier League, qualification to the Champions League may be viewed as promotion to Continental Club Competition. Accessing these higher levels of competition such as the Champions League undoubtedly bring teams substantial financial rewards.
“Similarly, teams relegated to the Championship from the Premier League also retain considerable financial advantages over their new opponents. As discussed in our new paper published this week, these come in the form of accumulated Premier League revenues that are much greater than those associated in the Championship, as well as receiving parachute payments to help with the revenue shortfall associated with relegation.
“This may create a multiplier effect, where being successful, or at least accessing competitions that provide higher payouts, may breed further success. This can lead to persistence in success for already successful clubs. As such, in the Premier League, the established elite tend to remain there, while relegated Premier League clubs frequently yo-yo between the Championship and the Premier League.
“Our research showcases this advantage, and since 2006/07, parachute payment recipients have started the Championship season with an effective six-point headstart and are 18 percentage points more likely to finish in the play-off positions or better relative to non-parachute recipients.
“Financial regulation, although introduced to safeguard football club finances, has exacerbated these issues. The Profit & Sustainability rules that operated in football, both in the Premier League and Championship, restricted the losses clubs could make, effectively creating a glass ceiling, with the established incumbents on top.
“These clubs had greater revenues to offset the salary costs to compete at the top. In the Championship, we found a similar story emerges. As our new report shows, following the introduction of Profit & Sustainability restrictions, the on-field advantage enjoyed by parachute recipients increased to 11 points over a season, and these clubs were 31 percentage points more likely to finish in the top six.
“Yet, there is a silver lining. Recent changes to financial regulation in football have provided the non-elites with an opportunity to compete. Both the Premier League and Championship have shifted to squad cost ratios (SCR), limiting these costs to 85% of football related revenue. In addition, in the Championship, owners may inject equity up to £33m over three years, with a maximum increase of £15m per season, which should help teams to strengthen their on-field talent in the quest for success. The extension of the number of playoff berths available in the Championship, now down to eighth place also provide teams the opportunity to reach the Premier League.
“Clubs may still find ways to operate within these constraints. Efficient player trading as demonstrated by Brighton & Hove Albion, may allow them to reinvest these funds and not break SCR rules, as net player trading is part of the calculation structure.
“Alternatively, teams like Brentford, who using data-led recruitment to purchase undervalued talent may also allow them to compete. Growing revenue sources is equally imported to try break into the higher echelons and we’ve seen Aston Villa explore initiatives such as their Warehouse Matchday Zone to capture more supporter spending, growing their revenues in order to utilise these funds on the field.
“Overall, while the recent changes to financial regulation provide greater flexibility for clubs seeking to challenge the established hierarchy, they may not remove the competitive imbalance that has arisen under these policies. As such, it provides a further example of the unintended consequences that arise with policy changes in sporting contest design.”
Authored by Dr Rewilak, ‘Parachute payments, profit and sustainability rules, and competitive balance in the English football championship’ can be read in full by visiting: sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S3051268926000887