Seriality and “Everyone’s Place Under the Sun”: Proudhon with Kant.

Whole Earth, Fragile Planet?

…Ainsi le principe d’occupation est abandonné: on ne dit plus : La terre est au premier qui s’en empare…désormais l’on avoue que la terre n’est point le prix de la course ; à moins d’autre empêchement, il y a place pour tout le monde au soleil. Chacun peut attacher sa chèvre à la haie, conduire, sa vache dans la plaine, semer un coin de champ, et faire cuire son pain au feu de son foyer.

…Thus, the principle of occupation is abandoned; no longer is it said: « The land belongs to the one who first seizes it… But henceforth… it will be admitted that the earth is not a prize to be won in a race; in the absence of any other obstacle, there is a place for everyone under the sun. Each one may tie his goat to the hedge, lead his cow to pasture, sow a corner of a field, and bake his bread by his own fireside.


…ein Besuchsrecht, welches allen Menschen zusteht, sich zur Gesellschaft anzubieten, vermöge des Rechts des gemeinschaftlichen Besitzes der Oberfläche, auf der, als
Kugelfläche, sie sich nicht ins Unendliche zerstreuen können, sondern endlich sich
doch neben einander dulden zu können, ursprünglich aber niemand an einem Orte der
Erde zu sein mehr Recht hat, als der andere.

..a right of resort, for all men are entitled to present themselves in the society of others
by virtue of their right to communal possession of the earth’s surface. Since the earth
is a globe, they cannot disperse over an infinite area, but must necessarily tolerate one
another company. And no-one originally has any greater right than anyone else to
occupy any particular portion of the earth”.


This planet is spherical and finite; its surface is characterised by a preponderance of water and
limited land mass. The earth revolves around the sun. The sun shines above us, intermittently
and variably, depending on weather, time of day or night, season, atmospheric pollution,
climate and its changes. For Kant and for Proudhon, all these physiogeographical factors
necessitate a cosmopolitics, i.e. a political thinking which is given form by, and mediated
through, a consideration of the planet as a living and dying whole. This underlying and
contributing condition is seen to necessitate a reconsideration of property rights in the light of
a primordial claim to common and precious natural resources, including land.

According to Kant’s Anthropology, the cosmopolitical point of view takes us beyond egotism
towards pluralism, i.e. to “a way of thinking which considers itself and behaves not as a world
unto itself but as a simple citizen of the world (sondern als einen blossen Weltbürger)” (411).
Such “pluralism” can take the form of a synchronic dialogue with others. In “On the Common
Saying: “This may be true in theory but it does not apply in practice” (1793), the
cosmopolitical sphere is additionally presented as a diachronic engagement with humanity as
an evolving species. Kant writes:

I am a member of a series of human generations ([ein] Glied der Reihe der
Zeugungen], and as such, I am not as good as I ought to be or could be according to
the moral requirements of my nature. I base my argument upon my inborn duty of
influencing posterity in such a way that it will make constant progress (and I must thus
assume that progress is possible—it can be interrupted (unterbrochen) not broken off
(abgebrochen) and that this duty must be rightfully handed down from one member of
the series to the next [von einem Gliede der Zeugungen zum andern] (Kant 1994, 63).

The getting beyond our partial and finite perspective (Kant 1994, 90), the mobilization of a
dynamic sense of humanity as a whole, constantly emerging in and through time, is brought
about by a dutiful and responsible engagement with our seriality: “I am a member of a series
of human generations”.

“Seriality” (or “seriation”) was a key term for Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. He explicitly
adopted it from Charles Fourier, who had identified it as the way natural processes develop
and as the manner in which societal relations should be likewise organised. According to
Fourier, when enlightened philosophers appeal to an abstract, disembodied notion of reason
that all humans are supposed to have in common, they are in effect thwarting qualitative
social change as they stultify those very mechanisms, the passions, that exist to combine us
into social harmony. A creatively dynamic social whole is produced, not in spite of the
passions, but in a finely tuned concert with them as long as they are expansively developed in
what he calls a “progressive series” which fosters not only variety and differentiation but also
creative intersplicing and cross-fertilisation (TQM 128; TFM 15). The enthusiastic adoption
of seriality as a social practice would provide a solution to many current antisocial ills. For
instance, Fourier suggests that in today so-called civilization, children spend all their time at
home crying, breaking things, quarrelling and refusing to work. However, as soon as they join
the progressive Series or Series of groups they will work all the time, compete spontaneously
among themselves, and eagerly find out as much as they can about agriculture, manufacture,
science, and the arts. They will be productive and profitable whilst thinking that they are just enjoying themselves. Once parents experience the effect the new order has on their children, they will find them adorable when they are in Series and detestable when they are in [the] incoherent households [of “civilization”].

Seriality was also a key notion for Saint-Simon, whose work is approvingly analysed by Proudhon in *Idée générale de la révolution*. For Saint-Simon, instead of summoning a sense of where and who one is and of the general state of affairs in the world from the present time, which he asserts is “the least solid basis” for understanding anything (V TGU 287), the method one should adopt consists of fixing one’s eyes on the distant “remnants of a past which is fading and the germs of a future which is coming to life” (III SI 69). By fostering a keen sense of society as a mutating movement through time, variously shaped by different methods for conceptualizing the world, structured by different dominant regimes and their underlying opposing forces, a “series of terms” emerges that provides the compositional elements of the future (I COR 122, V MSH14). By situating ourselves along this tensile line of communication between historical periods stretching into the past and out to the future, we are given a better and clearer sense of ourselves as productive “capacities,” that is, both as the containers through which the “march of civilization” passes, and as potentialities that can actively and positively contribute to the world to come.¹

Proudhon also identified the operation of “seriality”, as a way of understanding the world around us and as a method of engaging with it and those within it, as being at work within Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*. The table of categories, which Kant describes as containing “nifty observations” (“artige Betrachtungen”), helpfully provides:
The complete plan of a whole science, so far as science rests on a priori concepts, and [divides] it systematically according to determinate principles… the table contains all the elementary concepts of the understanding in their completeness, nay, even the form of a system of them in the human understanding, and accordingly indicates all the momenta of a projected speculative science, and even their order… (B109-110)

Table of Categories

Of Quantity
Unity
Plurality
Totality

Of Quality
Reality
Negation
Limitation

Of Relation
Of Inherence and Subsistence
Of Causality and Dependence
(cause and effect)
Of community (reciprocity between agent and patient)

Of Modality
Possibility-Impossibility
Existence- Non-existence
Necessity-Contingency

In La création de l’ordre dans l’humanité (1843), Proudhon highlights the importance of Kant’s table of categories for serial theory and practice. They are “twelve types (genres), or points of view, which are preformed in understanding. [Every series is necessarily constructed under] these general points of view” (163). “Concepts are divided into four families, each composed of three categories which engender each other, the second always being the antithesis or opposite of the first and the third proceeding from the two others by way of a sort of composition”. Kant’s aim was to show that the fundamental law of reasoning consists above all things in not at all concluding from one category to another (à ne point conclure d’une catégorie à une autre), which is… the very principle of serial dialectics. There are few
dialecticians comparable to Kant”, Proudhon maintains. Hegel went on to generalise Kant’s “ingenious idea” (164).

As the series is a process, it is “the antithesis of unity; it forms itself through repetition, from positions and diverse combinations of unity”. The serial dialectic is an “unfolding” (déroulement), “a transformation of terms”, a “perpetual equation”. It is the “art of composing and decomposing our ideas” in a manner which engages with the world reflectively, dialogically and creatively (189). Proudhon maintains that:

Everything in nature produces itself and develops itself by series. The series is the supreme condition of life, duration, beauty, as well as of science and reason. Every manifestation of substance and force which does not contain within itself its own law, i.e. the mode of seriation which makes it what it is, is anormal, subversive and transitory (Créa II, 17).

Social phenomena also demonstrate a natural seriality, if they are sensitively interpreted social phenomena can equally well express seriality. Proudhon makes it clear that:

To discover a series is to perceive unity in multiplicity. It is not about using one’s mental predisposition to create an order but about putting oneself into the presence of order. When one uses one’s awakened intelligence, one perceives its image (Créa I, 197).

Serial organization is naturally self-generated and self-managed. It cannot be solicited by heavy-handedly imposing a governing principle, but instead requires the respectful recognition of its continual incipience. For Proudhon, ‘creation’ is the ‘putting-into-action of a series’ which involves an observation of the processes of nature. Natural differences, oppositions, incompatibilities and conflicts become productive, even ‘beautiful’, when a series emerges from them. The natural order of society does not manifest itself as a hierarchised- i.e. perhaps steady but almost static- unit but as ‘a succession of contradictions organized in a series’. Order does not result from a ‘hierarchy of functions and faculties’, but instead it is constantly recreated out of the reiterated balancing and complex organization of
Order requires the respectful employment of ‘free forces’, not their attempted subjugation by power (*pouvoir*). Power (*pouvoir*) is an instrumentalisation of societal forces along formal and institutionalised lines. It functions largely through control. By contrast, the power in ‘*puissance(s)*’ is able to work with the energetic and creative forces which are both inherent in, and which pass through, individual and group capacities. ‘Capacity’, a term that Proudhon adopted from Saint-Simon (mentioned earlier), signifies both an aptitude and a container, i.e. it refers not only to a talent (either configured as an innate potentiality or an acquired skill) but also to a canal or tube through which a force passes. Capacities can become positive social forces on the condition that they retain or gain some autonomy both for self-development, and for facilitating the circulation of energies emerging from, and heading on, elsewhere. If these conditions are not met, they just become instruments of power (*pouvoir*), means to other ends. They block the flow of communication between producers. In such a situation unhappiness and stress are often produced, a climate of threat and anxiety reign. There is certainly no chance for any form of positive energy to galvanize and motivate the workforce.

The unnatural suspension of ‘seriation’ has a detrimental impact on human intelligence, spirit and conscience as, for Proudhon, the human is naturally the producer or contemplator of a series. Regardless of whether the human creates or imitates, acts or reflects, the series naturally informs him and he gives it form. Proudhon elaborates as follows:

> When humans make the most ingenuous and complex of things, those things which are multiple yet unified, they are necessarily made by him in infinitely small parts. These parts are linked by a relation of progression. At the end they produce an assemblage, a whole, a composition, a series. The immobilization of the worker in one of these infinitesimal parts of production constitutes fragmented work (*travail parcellaire*). This immobility is a factor of disorder… (Créa vol II p.57 §430).

The division of labour becomes a undesirable ‘fractioning’ (*fraction*), ‘breaking up’ (*morcellement*) or ‘decomposition of the industrial *oeuvre*’ which locks the isolated worker into an alienating operation, when he is reduced to knowing only how to make, for instance, ‘one eighteenth of a nail’ (Créa vol II, p.50). In order to preserve the integrity of the differentiated act of work and its combinatory capacity within a series (with others) which is...
the precondition for ‘life, duration, beauty’, Proudhon excludes certain jobs as socially destructive. He gives the following examples of outlawed forms of pseudo-work:

The social series does not allow knife-sharpeners, cat-castrators, dog-groomers, brutish porters, hideous rag-pickers (chiffonniers); it also does not permit the sellers of pipes, walking-sticks, snuffboxes, pearls, amber, coral, combs etc found in oriental bazaars. The moralists are right to oppose this sort of division of labour taken to the extreme (Créa vol II, p.50 ; 17).

Whilst Proudhon’s choice of examples might well be controversial, a debate about what actually constitutes socially valuable forms of work could be politically crucial in a period such as ours marked by “economic crisis” and the dismantling of the public sector.

Facilitating a socially useful separation and differentiation, a dividing up and out as a means of furthering a serial organization of work necessitates the relinquishment of power (pouvoir). As discussed earlier, this term refers to a centralizing, governing, institutionalizing, hierarchising structure which imposes a simplistic unity and uniformity. Proudhon wants to create ‘order’. However, the traditional discourse of politics (but also of religion, morality, science, law and even art) seeks to impose a masterly metalanguage to unite, englobe and sum up their subjects in the name of an integrated ‘unity’. As an advocate of life and its multitude of complex interchanges, processes and movements, Proudhon passionately resists this drive for homogenization. He writes:

The fanatics of unity do not want to see that the moral world, like the physical world, rests on a plurality of irreducible and antagonistic elements. The life and movement of the universe result from the contradiction of these elements.

Proudhon is enthusiastic about contradictions as a source of life. Hence the task of politics is to enable the serialization of contradictions. Decentralisation is the process which achieves this. Proudhon writes that one must ‘separate from the point of view of interests and material inevitabilities, everything that can be separated’, like nature does. Nothing should be left undivided which can be divided without deactivating the synthetic capacity for serialization described above. The societal processes of separation, such as increasing federalization which Proudhon sees as the future of politics, are serial and pluralistic devolutions which accompany the various forces of life itself. In the state massive units are difficult to mobilize and therefore prone to inertia. They benefit from being broken down into smaller, nimbler
entities which are able to respond to, and engage with, external bodies in a quicker and more fluid way. Likewise the organs of animals derive their “strength (puissance) and harmony” from an organised “separation” of their constituent parts and materials. The same goes for the operations of the workplace. Proudhon’s analysis of what constitutes a strong and harmonious system is totally incompatible with a hierarchically managed institution which attempts to impose a simplistic unity by means of a homogenising bureaucracy. For him such a state of managing affairs leads to disorder and unhappiness.

Proudhon considered seriality continuously to inform and give form to nature, to life itself. It is the cultural, socio-economic, political replication of seriality within human systems which can create “order in humanity”, an “order” which incessantly negotiates with, counterbalances, works with and against what Kant identifies as the contradictory and disjunctive “unsocial sociability” of human relations (Kant 1994, 44). For Kant, the possibility of this “order” is enforced by a moral injunction: it is a duty to contribute to the creation of such an “order” for humanity as a whole in time. Duty is one of the prime examples, if not the prime example, of a theory which cannot be considered to be an “empty ideality” by fault of supporting evidence in the form of practice. He writes: “For it would not be a duty to strive after a certain effect of our will if this effect were impossible in experience (whether we envisage the experience as complete or as progressively approximately to completion)” (62). All moral aims “as long as it is not demonstrably impossible to fulfil them, amount to duties” (p89). The repeated rejection of “theories”, such as that of us having “duties”, by recourse to an argument about their being “invalid in practice” is deemed by him to be an “illusory wisdom” as it “imagines it can see further and more clearly with its mole-

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1 Proudhon also suggests that seriality is a source of happiness and sense of fulfillment for us, though these results cannot be its end.

2 Proudhon is also for a form of order, it is just that he suggests that “society seeks [it] in anarchy” (Proudhon 2007 209). A dialogue between, Kant and Proudhon would have been interesting!
like gaze fixed on experience than with the eyes which were bestowed on a being designed to stand upright and to scan the heavens (den Himmel anzuschauen)” (Kant 1994, 63). Rather than grounding those theories which “ought to be” practiced in this world by supposed adverse experience, there is more mileage, more vision, in taking responsibility and looking beyond what is imminently here and now to actualize what “should be”. The duty of contributing positively to the future for posterity, which necessitates seeing oneself in relation with serial others to come, can bolster the “hope” that progress is possible (89). However, hopes remain nevertheless fragile, and even if they evaporate, duty still has a “force of certainty” which resists, Kant claims, “a rule of expediency which says that I ought not to attempt the impracticable (i.e. an illiquidium [something uncertain]), since it is purely hypothetical” (Kant 1994, 89). According to Kant, given one knows a duty, it cannot be definitively proven that to carry it out is “impractical”.

Proudhon also considers our implication in seriality in terms of duties and rights but he extrapolates these from needs (which Kant wouldn’t permit!). Nevertheless there is a consequential and forceful logic to the need-right-duty series. Proudhon writes:

Duty and right are born of need, which when considered in connection with others is a right, and in connection with ourselves, a duty. We have a need to eat and sleep; we have a right to procure those things which are necessary for rest and nourishment; we have a duty to use them when nature requires it. We have a need to labour in order to live; it is also our right and duty…We have a need to exchange our products for other products; we have a right for this exchange to be one of equivalents, and since we consume before we produce, it would be our duty, if it depended on us, to see to it that our last product should follow our last consumption (Proudhon 2007, 213).

3 I’ve edited out some of Proudhon’s rather unfortunate remarks about wives…
Our need to consume and produce gives us rights and implicates us in duties towards others, here and now, and in the future.

As we have already seen the unnatural suspension of “seriation” is seen to have a detrimental impact on human intelligence, spirit and conscience. The interruption or “immobilization” of the “need-right-duty” series can also produce negative, if not catastrophic, political, economic, social and indeed ecological effects. As we now well know, turning the planet and its natural resources into controlled and frozen private property, taken out of common circulation, is an ever increasing source of conflict. As Proudhon wrote:

   This immobility is a factor of disorder, a consequence of the simplistic and subversive organisation of the right to property that everything is working towards abolishing

   (Proudhon 2004, 57 §430).

The temporal and spatial mobility implied in **seriality** should lead necessarily to the overthrowing of any centralizing, governing, institutionalizing, hierarchising structure which imposes a simplistic unity and stultifying uniformity on its subjects on all of the three levels analysed by Kant in “On the Common Saying: “This may be true in theory but it does not apply in practice”: i.e. as employees in the workplace (Kant’s *Privat- or Geschäftsmann*) where morality is concerned with the well-being of individuals; as citizens within the state (what Kant calls a *Staatsmann*, where we are concerned with political relations regarding the well being of the state\(^4\), and from a “cosmopolitical point of view”, where the concern lies with “the well being [Wohl] of the human species (Gattung) as a whole, in so far as the welfare of humankind is increasing within a **series** of developments extending in all future ages (in der Reihe der Zeugungen aller künftigen Zeiten begriffen ist)”. At this level of international right, as cosmopolitically-aware citizens of the world, the redistribution of the

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\(^{4}\) Regarding governmentality there are many differences between. Kant and Proudhon…, though the former does promulgate a federation of republics in the “Towards Perpetual Peace essay, a proposal that Proudhon have approved of (Kant 1994, 104).
limited land and sea mass on our *globus terraqueus* in the light of current overall needs should ensue both as a right and as a duty.

In *The Metaphysics of Morals* (and in the “Towards Perpetual Peace” essay), Kant makes it clear that it is the physico-geographical fact of the earth’s sphericity which grounds “cosmopolitan right”, which should prevent it being just a mere “castle in the sky”. He writes:

This rational Idea of a peaceful, even if not friendly, thoroughgoing community *(Gemeinschaft)* of all peoples (*Völker*) on the earth that can come into relations affecting one another is not a philanthropic (ethical principle) but a principle having to do with rights. Nature has enclosed them all together within determinate limits (by the spherical shape of the place they live in, a *globus terraqueus* (*vermöge der Kugelgestalt ihres Aufenthalts, als globus terraqueus*). And since possession of the land (*und, da der Besitz des Bodens*), on which an inhabitant of the earth can live, can be thought only as possession of a part of a determinate whole (*nur als Besitz von einem Teil eines bestimmten Ganzen*), and so as possession of that to which each of them originally has a right (*folglich als ein solcher, auf den jeder derselben ursprünglich ein Recht hat*), it follows that all peoples (*Völker*) stand originally *(ursprünglich ein Recht hat)* in a community of land *(in einer Gemeinschaft des Bodens)*, though not of rightful community of possession *(communio)* and so of use of it, or of property in it *(nicht aber der rechtlichen Gemeinschaft des Besitzes (communio) und hiemit des Gebrauchs oder des Eigentums an denselben….*(Kant 1989, 475-6; 1991b 158 §62)*.  

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5 “Possession” (*Besitz*)v. property (*Eigentum*), see Proudhon (1994, especially 65-6). In the “Towards Perpetual Peace” essay, Kant likewise locates the hospitable (though restricted) “right to visit” (*Besuchsrecht*) in an entitlement “to present [oneself] to the society of others by virtue of [ones’s] right to communal possession [*gemeinschaftlichen Besitz*] of the earth’s surface”. However, he does not go as far as Proudhon in deducing that “property is theft!”
Owing to the spherical shape of the globe, that is to the fact that ‘nature has enclosed [us] all together within determinate limits’, any claim that might be made on a particular part of the land as property (for private use) has to be moderated by the original right we all have to the ‘determinate whole’. It therefore follows that:

...all peoples (Völker)... stand in a community of possible physical interaction (Wechselwirkung) (commercium), that is, in a thoroughgoing relation of each to all the others of offering to engage in commerce (Verkehr) with any other, and each has a right to make this attempt without the other being authorized to behave toward it as an enemy because it has made this attempt. This right, since it has to do with the possible union of all peoples (Völker) with a view to certain universal laws for their possible commerce (Verkehrs), can be called cosmopolitan right (ius cosmopoliticum) (Kant 1989, 475-6; 1991b 158 §62 translation modified).

As a cosmopolitical thinker, Kant adopts a mereological argument which would consequentially mean that particular claims to parts of the land’s surface as ‘private property’ have to be reassessed, even temporarily suspended, in terms of others’ more universal, and rightful, claims to access to this planet and its resources as a whole. Proudhon’s distinction between “possession” (possession, Besitz) and “property” (propriété, Eigentum) needs to come into operation for serial theory and practice to work. “Possession” indicates a temporary occupation whose territorial claim is up for regular reassessment, particularly in times of scarcity of primary resources and the arising natural needs. “Property” aims permanently to fix the terrain to ownership; its absolutist claims are undermined by the claims of original possession. As we know, for Proudhon “property is theft”. However possession can also

(Proudhon 2007, 13). But maybe he should have… However, Proudhon (2005) also equivocated: “property is theft… and liberty”… For a critique of the precious “scarcity” of natural resources as a dangerous myth, see Achterhuis in Sachs (1995, 104-115), to be discussed later.
protect “property” when its claims are made in the name of a responsible stewardship of collective resources which benefits all. After all, for Proudhon property is not just “theft” but also “liberty”. Such an ecologically informed cosmopolitics would respond to Kant’s concern for the respect of other economically “minor” cultures’ property, which is vulnerable to imperialist domination, inasmuch as biodiversity is (should be recognised as!) crucial for the future sustainability of the globe, for the liberty of all to live and breathe. Ecological concerns correspond to the seriality of needs-duties-rights expounded by Proudhon and to the responsibilising recognition that we are “member[s] of a series of human generations”, of an evolving species, evoked by Kant in relation to “cosmopolitan right”. For the sake of these future generation a scorched-earth politico-economics should be scrapped in favour of a different approach to life and the three levels of well-being already indicated by Kant, as Privat- or Geschäftsmann, the Staatsmann and, from a “cosmopolitical” standpoint, that of “the human species as a whole” (das Wohl der Menschengattung im Ganzen”).

Such an argument may well speak to us forcefully now given the even increasing privatisation and monopolization of natural resources and concomitant ecological concerns. Proudhon’s conclusion, which in effect reiterates Kant’s argument for cosmopolitan right and a cosmopolitical point of view, is that:

There is a place for everyone under the sun. Each one may tie his goat to the hedge, lead his cow to pasture, sow a corner of a field, and bake his bread by his own fireside” (Proudhon 2007, 69).

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Related work:


The Reaffirmation of Social Values in the Work of Saint-Simon, Fourier and Proudhon (Ralahine Utopia Series, Peter Lang) forthcoming.

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6 As we know, wars will be increasingly fought over basic natural resources essential to survival. For the essential and existential importance of water, see Strang 2004.
1 For this double meaning of ‘capacity’ in Saint-Simon’s works, see Pierre Musso, Le vocabulaire de Saint-Simon (Paris: ellipses, 2005), pp.12–14; and Diane Morgan, ‘Saint-Simon, Fourier and Proudhon’, p.267.

2 Hence, Proudhon suggests that ‘organising work means finding the natural series of the workers’ (De la création de l’ordre dans l’humanité, vol II, p.46).


6 For the series as the condition for the creation of ‘life, duration and beauty’, see the reference cited above.


11 Federalism is perceived by Proudhon as being the logical outcome of ‘mutualism’: ‘When it is translated into the realm of politics, what we have hitherto termed mutualism or guaranteeism is called federalism. The entire political and economic revolution is summed up in this simple synonym’. See Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Selected Writings, p.111. For an account of ‘mutualism’, see Diane Morgan. ‘Saint-Simon, Fourier and Proudhon’, pp.297-99.


13 As for Fourier, harmony should not be understood as beatific concord. As Trinquier makes clear, for Proudhon the golden age is far from being a world without conflict. On the contrary, ‘it is a world in which the liveliest oppositions can develop and organise themselves freely’. Charles Fourier, De la création de l’ordre dans l’humanité, Vol. I, p. 19.